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Why Have Corporate Tax Revenues
Declined?
Corporate income tax revenues have declined dramatically during the
last two decades. The corporate tax accounted for almost 20 percent of
federal receipts during the 1960s, compared with only 7 percent of fed-
eral receipts in the last five years. Federal corporate taxes averaged
3.9 percent of gross national product (GNP) during the first five years of
the 1960s, 2.7 percent of GNP for the first five years of the 1970s, and
only 1.4 percent of GNP for the first five years of the 1980s. In 1985, the
tax-to-GNP ratio was less than half what it was ten yearsago and only
one quarter as large as in 1955. In 1982, real corporate tax payments were
lower than in any year since 1940. Although corporate taxes in each of
the last three years were substantially greater than in 1982, theaverage
level of tax receipts remains at its postwar low.
The erosion of corporate tax revenues is widely regarded as the result
of legislative changes. For example, a frequently cited study by McIntyre
(1984) argues that
The decline of the corporate tax began with the adoption of the investment tax
credit in the 1960s, and continued into the 1970s as Congress adopted one loop-
hole after another in response to corporate lobhyists...the largest single blow to
the corporate tax came in 1981 with the passage of...the Accelerated Cost Re-
covery System, which opened up massive new possibilities for corporate tax
avoidance. (p. 1)
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Petrick (BEA), Len Smith (Joint Tax Committee), William States (IRS), John Voight (IRS),
and Teresa Weadock (BEA) for data assistance, to Jane Gravelle and Lawrence Summers for
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This viewpoint clearly influenced the architects of the recently enacted
Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA). The new law's stringent corporate mini-
mum tax of 20 percent, coupled with significant reductions in capital
recovery allowances, will raise corporate taxes by $120 billion during the
next five years.
This paper examines why corporate taxes have declined. It clecom-
poses movements in federal tax receipts into components attributable to
changes in tax rates, changes in tax preferences, changes in corporate
profitabffity, and other factors. The results suggest that although legis-
lative changes have been important contributors tp the decline of corpo-
rate tax revenues, they account for less than half of the change since the
mid-1960s. Reduced profitability, which has shrunk the corporate tax
base, is the single most important cause of declining corporate taxes.
The paper is divided into five sections. Section 1 documents the de-
cline in corporate tax revenues during the last three decades. Section 2
presents a simple division of changes in corporate taxes into compo-
nents due to changes in tax rules and changes in the corporate tax base.
It shows that during the last twenty years, though the average tax jate
has fallen by nearly one third, corporate profitability has declined by a
factor of two. Section 3 examines the factors that have been most impor-
tant in reducing average corporate tax rates. It focuses on changes in
capital recovery, inflation-induced misstatement of corporate profits, and
various legislative changes. The fourth section examines the expected
revenue gains under the TRA and presents preliminary evidence on how
the bill will alter average tax rates. There is a brief conclusion.
1. The Withering Corporate Income Tax
The decline in corporate taxes played an important part in stimulating
recent calls for tax reform. The withering of the corporate income tax,
however, began long before the passage of the conomic Recovery Tax
Act (ERTA) in 1981. Corporate tax payments as a share of GNP or the
value of corporate assets have been declining for nearly three decades.
This trend accelerated during the last five years, when real corporate
taxes also declined.
Table 1 presents four measures of the net corporate tax payments by
nonfinancial corporations. We measure tax payments net of refunds ob-
tained by carrying current losses back to offset prior taxes, including
taxes collected as a result of audits or other retabulations. A detailed
description of our data series is provided in the appendix. We focus
on nonfinancial corporations (NFCs) because they were most signifi-
cantly affected by the changes in capital recovery rules under ERTA. TheWHY HAVE CORPORATE TAX REVENUES DECLINED? 3
NFCs accounted for 89 percent of corporate tax revenues in 1984 and
1985, and movements in their tax payments track total taxes very closely.
There are also detailed tax provisions affecting financial firms (see Neu-
big and Steuerle (1983)) that we avoid by focusing on the NFCs.
The first column of Table 1 reports the NFC's real corporate tax pay-
Table 1 FEDERAL CORPORATE TAX REVENUES, 1959-1985
Data on tax receipts from the nonfinancial corporate sector are based on authors' calculations, which are




NFC federal taxes as a percentage of
GNP
Replacement cost
of net NFC assets
Federal
receipts
1959 73.7 3.94 4.74 21.6
1960 66.7 3.48 4.25 18.5
1961 66.9 3.41 4.22 18.4
1962 67.8 3.28 4.24 17.6
1963 75.0 3.49 4.65 18.3
1964 77.2 3.41 4.74 19.1
1965 85.9 3.58 5.17 20.1
1966 89.5 3.54 5.16 19.0
1967 80.9 3.10 4.38 16.6
1968 92.3 3.40 4.88 17.1
1969 85.9 3.09 4.42 14.9
1970 64.5 2.33 3.21 12.1
1971 67.4 2.36 3.29 12.9
1972 71.3 2.38 3.41 12.5
1973 80.0 2.54 3.69 13.1
1974 75.7 2.42 3.12 12.1
1975 66.4 2.15 2.53 11.6
1976 79.7 2.46 2.96 12.9
1977 83.9 2.47 3.04 12.8
1978 87.7 2.45 3.01 12.5
1979 81.8 2.23 2.66 11.1
1980 70.0 1.91 2.14 9.4
1981 57.3 1.54 1.68 7.4
1982 37.7 0.93 0.98 4.6
1983 47.4 1.26 1.39 6.5
1984 59.5 1.49 1.76 7.7
1985 50.0 1.22 1.51 6.2
Five-year averages
1961-65 74.5 3.43 4.60 18.7
1966-70 82.6 3.09 4.41 16.0
1971-75 72.1 2.37 3.21 12.4
1976-80 80.6 2.31 2.76 11.8
1981-85 49.6 1.29 1.47 6.54 AUERBACH & POTERBA
ments, measured in 1986 dollars. These tax payments peaked at $92.5 bil-
lion in 1968, and, with the exception of three years in the late 1970s, they
have been substantially below this level ever since. Average tax payments
by the NFCs were $78.6 billion in the 1960s, $76.4 billion in the 1970s,
and $49.6 billion for the last five years. The data demonstrate the recent
decline in corporate tax revenues, however, since average payments for
1976 to 1980 were 63 percent greater than average revenues in the last five
years.
This decline in corporate taxes is even more remarkable when viewed
in the context of the growing economy. The second and third columns in
Table 1 describe corporate taxes relative to GNP and corporate assets.
Corporate taxes averaged 3.7 percent of GNP during the 1960s, com-
pared with 1.3 percent during the first half of the 1980s. In 1982, when
corporate taxes reached their postwar low, they accounted for only 0.9
percent of GNP. An equally pronounced decline emerges from column 3,
which shows the ratio of tax payments by nonfinancial corporations to
the net replacement value of their tangible assets. This asset measure is
constructed by subtracting corporate debt outstanding from the replace-
ment cost of corporate tangible assets and provides a natural scaling vari-
able for corporate taxes, because it reflects changes in the size of the
corporate sector. Tax payments by NFCs averaged 4.6 percent of net as-
sets during the first five years of the 1960s and were even higher at the
end of the 1950s. The tax-to-asset ratio has fallen by a factor of 3 during
the last twenty-five years. For the five years ended 1985, it averaged 1.5
percent, and it fell below 1 percent in 1982. Taxes as a percent of assets
fell by 1.4 percent between 1961-1965 and from 1971-1975 and declined
by as much again during the last ten years.
Corporate taxes have also become a substantially less important part of
the federal budget. They accounted for 6.5 percent of revenues during
the most recent five years. By comparison, corporate taxes were nearly
three times as important, accounting for 18.7 percent of federal reve-
nues, from 1961 to 1965. The rapid growth of federal revenues from
other sources, particularly social insurance taxes, coupled with declin-
ing corporate taxes to explain the pronounced reduction in the corporate
tax share during the last twenty-five years.
2. Declining Tax Rates Versus Declining Tax Base
The decline in corporate taxes can be divided into two components: a de-
clime in the rate at which corporate profits are taxed, and a decline in
corporate profits themselves. The first component is the average tax rate,
which has attracted widespread attention in the tax policy debate oWHY HAVE CORPORATE TAX REVENUES DECLINED? 5
the last five years (see Joint Committee (1984)or Spooner (1986), for
example). Many analyses of the corporate tax focus exclusivelyon the
average rate, however, and imply the misleading conclusion that its
movements are the sole cause of recent reductions in corporate taxreve-
nues. This section demonstrates that although average tax rates have de-
clined, changes in corporate profits, the base of the corporate incometax,
are an equally important factor in explaining the change in corporate
taxes.
2.1 EFFECTIVE TAX RATES AND THE TAX-TO-ASSET RATIO
The tax-to-asset ratio is the product of theaverage tax rate and the corpo-
rate profit rate:
Taxes/Assets = (Taxes/Profits) (Profits/Assets).(1)
Profits denote the real economic profits earned by corporateequity hold-
ers,1 Taxes/Profits is the average effective tax rate, and Profits/Assets
defines the real economic profit rate. Profits excludes foreignsource in-
come of U.S. corporations, since our asset measure includes only domes-
tic capital. A detailed description of our measure of economic profitsis
provided in the Appendix.
Table 2 presents data on the tax-to-asset ratio, theaverage tax rate, and
the profit rate for each year since 1959, the year whensome IRS data used
in our calculations first became available. The data clearly indicate that
both falling average tax rates and a decline in profitability havecontrib-
uted to lower corporate taxes. The average effective tax ratewas 41.8 per-
cent during the 1960s, compared with 30.8 percent during the last five
years, a decline of more than one quarter. Average tax rates declined
throughout the 1970s, averaging 43.4 percent for 1971 to 1975 and40.1
percent for 1976 to 1980. The average effective tax rate for 1981-1985was
9 percent lower than its value for 1976-1980. This decline is twiceas large
as the drop between the first and second halves of the 1970s.
The second column of Table 2 reports the economic profitrate on non-
financial corporate capital. The profit rate trends down throughoutour
sample period but drops quite sharply in the 1980s. Froman average of
1. Alternative views of what constitutes the corporate tax baseare also possible. Feldstein
and Summers (1979) and Feldstein, Dicks-Mireaux, and Poterba (1983) consider the total
earnings of the corporate sector, including those paid to debt holders,as the tax base.
Because interest payments are taxed less heavily than equity earnings, measuring the
average tax rate relative to this base would lower the average tax rate but not affect its
decline over time. The profit rate associated with this concept of corporate profitshas
also declined significantly during our sample period.6 AUERBACH & POTERBA
10.9 percent during the 1960s, the profit rate fell to 7.2 percentduring
the 1970s and 4.9 percent during the last five years. In 1982,when corpo-
rate taxes reached their postwar low, the corporateprofit rate was also at
its lowest level (2.9 percent). Although profits accruing toequity holders
have rebounded since then, averaging 6.3 percent in thelast two years,
they are stifi well below their level in the previous twodecades.
Table 2 THE AVERAGE TAX RATE AND CORPORATEPROFITABILITY,
The three columns correspond to Taxes/Profits, Profits/Assets, andTaxes/Assets as described in the text.







Ratio of taxes to
NFC net assets
1959 0.50 9.55 4.74
1960 0.51 8.30 4.25
1961 0.48 8.79 4.22
1962 0.42 10.09 4.24
1963 0.44 10.70 4.65
1964 0.41 11.69 4.74
1965 0.38 13.55 5.17
1966 0.38 13.70 5.16
1967 0.38 11.52 4.38
1968 0.41 11.93 4.88
1969 0.43 10.17 4.42
1970 0.45 7.07 3.21
1971 0.41 7.94 3.29
1972 0.41 8.38 3.41
1973 0.43 8.67 3.69
1974 0.50 6.20 3.12
1975 0.42 5.95 2.53
1976 0.43 6.83 2.96
1977 0.38 7.98 3.04
1978 0.38 7.92 3.01
1979 0.40 6.59 2.66
1980 0.41 5.27 2.14
1981 0.36 4.62 1.68
1982 0.34 2.88 0.98
1983 0.32 4.40 1.39
1984 0.28 6.24 1.76
1985 0.24 6.40 1.51
Five-year averages
1961-65 0.42 10.96 4.60
1966-70 0.41 10.88 4.41
1971-75 0.44 7.43 3.21
1976-80 0.40 6.92 2.76
1981-85 0.31 4.91 1.47WHY HAVE CORPORATE TAX REVENUES DECLINED?7
This dramatic decline in corporate profits isan important source of
lower corporate tax receipts. The last colunm of Table 2 showsthat the
tax-to-asset ratio at the beginning of the 1960s, for example,was 3.1
times that at the beginning of the 1980s. Theaverage effective tax rate
was 1.35 times its level in recent years, and the profit rate was 2.2 times
its recent value. Declining profitability is therefore substantiallymore
important than changes in the average tax rate in accounting forthe re-
duction in corporate taxes.
The relative importance of changes in tax rates and thetax base can be
illustrated by calculating what corporate tax receipts in theearly 1980s
would have been if either the average tax rateor the profit rate had re-
mained at its earlier level while the other changedover time. Actual cor-
porate tax receipts averaged 49.6 billion 1986 dollars in 1981-1985. If the
profitabifity of corporate assets had been thesame as in the 1960s, tax
receipts would have more than doubled to $110.4 bfflion. Evensetting
the profit rate equal to its value for 1976-1980 would haveincreased
annual revenues by over $20 bfflion, to $72.5 billion. Fixingthe average
effective tax rate at its earlier level would also have raisedtaxes, though
not by as much as the return to earlier profit levels. If the taxrate during
the last five years had returned to its level in the early 1960s,taxes would
have averaged $68.4 bfflion per year. Replacing the actualtax rate with its
average value for the late 1970s would raise tax receipts by $13 biffion to
$62.5 billion per year.
2.2 INTERPRETING THE AVERAGE TAX RATE
Although our division of the tax-to-asset ratio intoaverage tax rate and
profit rate components may provide some insight into thesource of de-
clining tax revenues, the two components are not independent. Thena-
ture of the corporate income tax makes the average taxrate critically
dependent upon the level of corporate profits. For taxable firms,many
corporate tax deductions, such as depreciation allowances and tax cred-
its, may be claimed regardless of the level of profits. A 1percent increase
in profits therefore raises the firm's taxable corporate income bymore
than 1 percent, increasing the average tax rate.
An offsetting effect arises for nontaxable firms. For firms withnegative
taxable income and no capacity to carry losses back againstprior taxes,
current tax payments will be zero regardless of how negative their real
economic income is. An increase in profitability will not affect theirtaxes.
It wifi, however, increase their economic profits, whichenter the de-
nominator of the average tax rate calculation for the entirecorporate sec-
tor. These links between profitability and tax rates make it impossibleto
interpret changes in the average tax rate solelyas the result of legislation.8 AIJERBACH & POTERBA
A simple example can illustrate these points. Consider a firm that pur-
chases a capital asset for $1,000 and is entitled to tax depreciation allow-
ances of $150 per year, whereas the asset's trueeconomic depreciation is
$100 per year. If the firm uses no debt and has no other inputs to the
production process, then its real economic profits are its receipts less
$100. If the economic profit rate is 7 percent, receipts will equal $170 and
the firm's taxable income will be $20. Assuming a flat-rate corporate
income tax with a 0.50 marginal rate, the firm pays $10 in taxes for an
average tax rate of 10/70 = 0.142, and a tax-to-assetratio of 0.01. Now
consider what happens if the economic profit rate rises to 10 percent,
bringing receipts to $200. Taxable income rises to $50, so taxes are $25,
the tax-to-asset ratio is 0.025, and the average tax rate is 0.25. Shocks to
corporate profits therefore affect measured average tax rates, even when
the tax system is held constant.
To ifiustrate how, if some firms have tax losses, increased profits can
lower the average tax rate, we introduce a second firm. It owns assets
identical to those of the first firm, which earns a 7 percent return, but it
operates in a different market with a 3 percent profit rate. Its receipts are
$130, taxable income equals $20, and it pays no taxes. The aggregate
tax rate, computed by adding together the taxes of both firms and divid-
ing by the sum of their profits, is 19.2 percent (25/130). The aggregate
profit rate is 6.5 percent (130/2000). Now consider what happens if the
second firm's profit rate rises to 5 percent. Its taxable income is now ex-
actly zero, but it stifi pays no taxes, so the aggregate average tax rate is
16.7 percent (25/150), down from 19.2 percent. The aggregate profit rate
rises to 7.5 percent, illustrating the possibility of a negative relationship
between profitabffity and the aggregate average tax rate.
The sensitivity of average tax rates to economic conditions is only one
of their many shortcomings as a measure of corporate tax burdens. It is
well known (see Auerbach (1983) or Fullerton (1984)) that average tax
rates may provide little information on the pattern of marginal tax incen-
tives facing new investments. In- addition, aggregate average tax rates
may conceal important lifferences in taxburdens across different assets
and different firms. Average corporate tax rates also provide an incom-
plete account of the tax burden on corporate income by ignoring the
taxes paid by shareholders.
There are also measurement problems associated with average tax
rates. They fail to consider "implicit taxes," such as the reduced returns
received by banks that invest in municipal debt, as part of the total tax
burden. Likewise, many sources of true economic income are ignored,
since certain accounting practices that misstate economic income are not
corrected. This problem even applies to the National Incomç Accounts.WHY HAVE CORPORATE TAX REVENUES DECLINED?9
An example of such a misstatement is the inappropriatetiming of ex-
penses under the completed contract accounting method. Accounting
differences accentuate the problem of comparingaverage tax rates across
industries.
3. Why Have Average Tax Rates Declined?
The last section demonstrated that declining profitsand declining aver-
age tax rates are jointly responsible for the dramatic fall incorporate
taxes. Despite numerous shortcomings,average tax rates do prove useful
in analyzing changes in corporate taxrevenues. They have also played an
important part in the recent corporate tax reform debate.This section
therefore extends our previous analysis by investigatingthe proximate
causes of declining average tax rates. The source of recent changes incor-
porate profitability constitutes an unresolved puzzle, whichis beyond
the scope of this paper.2
3.1 STATUTORY TAX RATES VERSUS AVERAGE TAX RATES
Movements in average tax rates may be traced to changesin capital re-
covery provisions, the increased prevalence of firms with tax losses,
increased use of investment tax credits, and other factors.Each of these
factors causes the average tax rate to differ from thestatutory maximum
rate, as shown in Table 3. The first column in Table 3 showsthe maxi-
mum statutory tax rate for each year from 1959 to 1985. The entries in the
six middle columns describe how various factors havecaused the average
tax rate to differ from the statutory rate. Negative entries indicatefactors
that caused the average tax rate to be less than thestatutory rate, and
positive entries correspond to factors that increased thetax burden
above the statutory rate. Theaverage tax rate, Taxes/Profits, is reported
in the last column. It is the sum of the maximumstatutory tax rate plus
the six adjustment factors in the middle columns. Adetailed description
of our methodology for decomposing theaverage tax rate is provided in
the Appendix.
The first source of differences between statutory andaverage tax rates
is increasingly generous capitalrecovery, as shown in the second column
of Table 3. This term includes both the tax reductionfrom use of the in-
vestment tax credit, as well as that due to differences betweentax de-
preciation and true economic depreciation. During themost recent five-
2. Since we are concerned primarily with the impact of legislative changeson tax receipts,
we focus on the role of tax reforms in altering the average tax rate. Although tax changes
may also affect revenues by altering profIts, this effect is likely to be small over the time
horizons we consider.10. AUERBACH & POTERBA
Table 3 CAUSES OF CHANGING AVERAGE TAX RATES, 1959-1985
A detailed description of these calculations is presented in the Appendix. All entries for 1984 and 1985
are based on preliminary data and extrapolations. The average tax rate (column 8) equals the statutory














1959 52.0 -3.1 -1.2 2.6 1.0 -3.4 1.749.7
1960 52.0 4.2 -0.8 4.9 1.2 -3.4 1.5 51.1
1961 52.0 -4.4 -1.5 3.6 0.5 -3.8 1.748.0
1962 52.0 -9.5 -2.0 3.30.4 -3.6 1.4 42.1
1963 52.0 -9.3 -1.0 3.20.5 -3.5 1.743.5
1964 50.0 -9.2 -0.8 2.50.4 -3.7 1.3 40.5
1965 48.0 -8.6 -1.3 1.8 0.3 -3.2 1.1 38.2
1966 48.0 -8.5 -1.6 1.60.3 -3.2 1.037.7
1967 48.0 -9.5 -1.0 2.2 0.4 -3.3 1.338.0
1968 52.8 -9.6 -2.4 2.4 0.6 -3.9 1.0 40.9
1969 52.8 -10.0 -1.5 4.1 0.74.2 1.543.4
1970 49.2 -9.7 -1.5 7.80.7 -3.2 2.1 45.4
1971 48.0 -8.54.1 6.4 0.5 -2.9 2.1 41.5
1972 48.0 -10.5 -1.1 4.0 1.1 -2.9 2.0 40.6
1973 48.0 -11.1 1.5 3.1 1.8 -2.6 1.942.6
1974 48.0 -13.9 10.2 5.1 1.0 -2.1 1.950.2
1975 48.0 -8.04.6 4.8 3.5 -2.9 1.742.4
1976 48.0 -7.9 0.9 3.6-0.2 -2.6 1.6 43.4
1977 48.0 -8.3 -0.6 3.2-1.2 -2.7 -0.3 38.2
1978 48.0 -8.5 0.3 3.0-0.5 -3.1 -1.1 38.0
1979 46.0 -10.4 3.8 4.3-0.9 -3.1 0.6 40.4
1980 46.0 -12.2 2.1 6.6 0.2 -3.3 1.340.6
1981 46.0 -17.3 -2.1 10.5 0.9 -2.5 0.9 36.4
1982 46.0 -26.3 -5.522.2 0.3 -3.8 1.234.2
1983 46.0 -21.8 -2.710.8 0.2 -3.7 2.931.7
1984 46.0 -21.2 -2.9 7.70.2 -3.7 2.128.2
1985 46.0 -24.2 -4.3 7.60.2 -3.7 1.923.6
Five-year averages
1961-6550.8 -8.2 -1.3 2.9 0.4 -3.5 1.4 42.5
1966-7050.2 -9.5 -1.6 3.6 0.5 -3.6 1.5 41.1
1971-7548.0 -9.5 0.4 4.7 1.6 -2.7 1.9 43.5
1976-8047.2 -9.5 1.3 4.1-0.5 -3.0 0.4 40.1
1981-8546.0 -22.1 -3.511.8 0.4 -3.5 1.8 30.8WHY HAVE CORPORATE TAX REVENUES DECLINED?. 11
year period, capital recovery provisions accounted for a 22 percent dif-
ferential between the statutory and the average tax rate. This isa sub-
stantial increase from the late 1970s, when these provisions explaineda
9.5 percent difference between the two tax rates,or the 1960s, when
these factors reduced the average tax rate by 8.9 percent.3 Becausegener-
ous capital recovery provisions have been one of the popular villains be-
hind the recent decline in corporate taxes, we shall later providea more
detailed breakdown of these effects.
The third column in Table 3 reports the effect of inflationon average
tax rates. This column combines two separate influences. First, inflation
leads to spurious inventory profits that raise corporate taxpayments and
the average tax rate. (Inflation's positive impact througha related
channel, the failure to index depreciation allowances for inflation, is sub-
sumed in the capital recovery term above.) Inflation alsoexerts a
countervailing effect on the average tax rate by reducing the real value of
corporate debt, generating capital gains for equity holders. These gains
are untaxed, so inflation raises economic income but does not affect
taxes. The two effects roughly cancel, resulting in a small net effect of
inflation on the average tax rate. Inflation raised theaverage tax rate by
less than 1 percent during the 1970s, and it has reduced theaverage tax
rate by 3.5 percent during the 1980s.
The fourth column in Table 3 indicates the impact of imperfect loss-
offset provisions on the average tax rate. The principal effect of imperfect
loss offset is to raise the average tax rate when firms experience losses,
since firms with negative income cannot claim tax refunds. Tax receipts
are therefore higher than they would be in a system with proportional
taxation of economic income. This effect is somewhat attenuated by the
availability of loss carrybacks and net operating loss carryforwards.
Carrybacks allow some loss offset in the year when lossesoccur. Loss
carryforwards, in contrast, reduce a firm's current tax liabilityas a result
of previous losses.
Imperfect loss-offset provisions may raise or lower theaverage tax rate,
depending on whether net operating loss deductions exceed the valueof
losses not carried back. The entries in column 4 of Table 3 showthat
throughout 1959 to 1985 imperfect loss offsets generateda substantial
net increase in the average tax rate. For the most recent fiveyears, the
provisions regarding losses increased the average tax rate by 11.8percent.
3. Our calculations may overstate the importance of capital recovery provisions in lowering
the average tax rate, because we assume that all changes in the difference betweentax
and economic depreciation were actually claimed by firms. For firms carrying losses for-
ward, this will overstate the importance of depreciation provisions and losses.12 AUERBACH & POTERBA
This is much larger than the impact of losses in any previous period.
Imperfect loss offsets accounted for a 4.4 percent increase in the average
tax rate in the 1970s and a 3.2 percent increase during the 1960s.This
result deserves emphasis: the increased incidence of tax losses during
the 1980s has increased, not reduced, the average corporate tax rate.
The filth column of Table 3 describes how foreign tax provisions affect
the average tax rate. This term consists of two parts. The first measures
the increase in taxes that would have resulted if foreign source income
were taxable at the U.S. statutory rate, and thesecond reduces taxes by
the amount of foreign tax credits claimed. If the statutory tax rates in all
other countries equaled that in the United States and all firms could uti-
lize foreign tax credits in full, then the net foreign tax effect in our table
would equal zero. If foreign countries levied taxes at rates below the do-
mestic rate, the foreign tax effect would be positive since the domestic
taxes on foreign source income would exceed the foreign tax credit. In
our data, the net effect of foreign tax provisionsis a small increase in the
average tax rate. This effect averages 0.4 percent in the lastfive years.
The sixth and seventh columns of Table 3 indicate the influence of two
other factors, tax progressivity and an "other" category, which includes
posttabulation revisions and miscellaneous tax credits, on the average
tax rate. Neither factor has a large effect. Tax progressivity, which ac-
counts for the fact that some corporate income is taxed at rates below the
statutory maximum, lowers the average tax rate by roughly 3.5 percent
with little variation over time. The "other" category usually raises the
average corporate tax rate, since the results of tax audits are included in
this category and they outweigh the other tax credits.
Table 3 clearly suggests that the most important factor causing average
tax rates to fall below the statutory rate is capital recovery. For the last five
years, capital recovery provisions depressed the average tax rateby 14
percent more than they did during the 1960s and by 13 percent more
than during the late 1970s. We now consider a more detailed breakdown
of changes in capital recovery provisions.
3.2 CHANGES IN CAPITAL RECOVERY PROVISIONS
The capital recovery variable in Table 3 has two parts: one due to the
capital consumption adjustment, and the other due to the investment tax
credit. The capital consumption adjustment is the difference between tax
depreciation and real economic depreciation. It has two components: ac-
celerated depreciation and basis misstatement. Accelerated depreciation
is the difference between tax depreciation and economic depreciation at
historic cost. Tax depreciation is based on tax service lives and deprecia-WHY HAVE CORPORATE TAX REVENUES DECLINED?. 13
tion schedules. It usually provides larger depreciation allowances than
would application of realistic economic lifetimes and decaypatterns to
the historic costs of corporate assets. Taxable income therefore under-
states economic income, reducing the average tax rate. The secondterm,
basis misstatement, measures the difference between straight-linede-
preciation using economic asset lives but historic asset costs and that
using the same decay profiles but revaluing assets eachyear to their cur-
rent replacement cost. Failure to index the basis of depreciableassets
raises taxable income above economic income and therefore increasesthe
average tax rate.
The data in Table 4 show the relative importance of the threeparts of
the capital recovery aggregate. During the last fiveyears, accelerated de-
preciation reduced the average tax rate by 35 percent, the investmenttax
credit (ITC) lowered it 13 percent, and inflationary misstatement ofasset
basis raised it by 26 percent. These large offsetting effects correspondto
the net effect of 22 percent that is reported in the third column ofTable
3. All three factors have become larger in absolute value duringour
sample period. In the 1960s, for example, accelerated depreciation low-
ered the average rate by 11.9 percent, inflation effects raised it by 5.4per-
cent, and the ITC lowered it by another 2.3 percent.
These results naturally raise the question of whethermovements in the
capital recovery factor are primarily the result of legislative changes,or
whether they have been caused by other forces, suchas a shift in the
composition of investment toward equipment rather than structures. Al-
though separating average tax rate movements intocomponents due to
legislative and other changes is a treacherous exercise,some illustra-
tive calculations are nonetheless possible. Ziemer (1985) estimatesthe
change in federal corporate tax revenues due to thepassage of the Eco-
nomic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsi-
bility Act of 1982, and presents a separate calculation for theimpact of
accelerated depreciation and other provisions. Using hisrevenue esti-
mates, we calculate that the average tax rate would have been about 7per-
cent higher during the last four years if the accelerated cost andrecovery
system (ACRS) had not been adopted. This corresponds to increased
revenues of $20 billion per year, on average, since 1982. The effect would
have been largest in 1985, the year with the largest stock ofassets receiv-
ing generous ACRS depreciation.
Although ACRS has lowered corporate taxes in the past fouryears,
focusing only on the immediate postenactment effects of tax legislation
can be misleading. Passage of a bill such as ERTA depresses corporate
taxes by more in the period immediately after enactment than it does in14 AUERBACH & POTERBA
Table 4 BREAKDOWN OF CAPITAL RECOVERY COMPONENTS IN
AVERAGE TAX RATE
Data used to construct this table are drawn from the National Income Accounts,Table 8.7, and from the
IRS Statistics of Income Sourcebook. Entries for 1984 and 1985 are based onpreliminary or extrapolated




Percentage point change in average tax rate from
Inflation-induced
Accelerated misstatement Investment
depreciation of tax basis tax credit
1959 -3.1 -10.8 7.7 0.0
1960 -4.2 -12.6 8.3 0.0
1961 -4.4 -11.5 7.1 0.0
1962 -9.5 -12.7 5.7 -2.4
1963 -9.3 -12.2 5.0 -2.2
1964 -9.2 -11.1 4.2 -2.3
1965 -8.6 -9.5 3.5 -2.5
1966 -8.5 -9.3 3.5 -2.7
1967 -9.5 -10.9 4.3 -3.0
1968 -9.6 -11.6 5.1 -3.1
1969 -10.0 -13.5 6.2 -2.6
1970 -9.7 -17.0 8.8 -1.6
1971 -8.5 -14.5 8.5 -2.4
1972 -10.5 -15.0 8.5 -4.0
1973 -11.1 -14.8 8.1 -4.4
1974 -13.9 -21.6 13.4 -5.7
1975 -8.0 -17.6 17.3 -7.7
1976 -7.9 -15.2 16.0 -8.8
1977 -8.3 -14.4 14.2 -8.2
1978 -8.5 -14.7 14.6 -8.4
1979 -10.4 -17.6 17.2 -10.0
1980 -12.2 -22.6 21.7 -11.3
1981 -17.3 -30.0 26.8 -14.0
1982 -26.3 -50.2 43.3 -19.3
1983 -21.8 -36.9 26.3 -11.2
1984 -21.2 -29.0 17.1 -9.3
1985 -24.2 -28.6 15.0 -10.6
Five-year averages
1961-1965 -8.2 -11.4 5.1 -1.9
1966-1970 -9.5 -12.5 5.6 -2.6
1971-1975 -10.4 -16.7 11.2 -4.9
1976-1980 -9.5 -16.9 16.7 -9.3
1981-1985 -22.1 -34.9 25.7 12.9WHY HAVE CORPORATE TAX REVENUES DECLINED?. 15
the steady state. Immediately after enactment, revenues are reduced
both because new assets are given substantial depreciation benefits im-
mediately after installation, and because some relatively old pre-reform
assets are still eligible for depreciation benefits under the previous, less
generous depreciation rules. In the steady state, only the generous de-
preciation for new assets reduces revenues. This partially explains why,
even without the TRA, corporate tax revenues were expected to rise dur-
ing the late 1980s. An opposite effect arises with the recent legislation,
which lengthens asset lives. It wifi collect more revenue in the shortrun
than in the steady state, because some aging pre-TRA assetsare paying
higher taxes than they would have if they had been depreciated under
the new rules.4
4. Corporate Taxes under the 1986 Tax Reform Act
The TRA shifts $120 billion of federal tax liability from households to
corporations from 1987 to 1991. The TRA will therefore affect both the
average tax rate and the tax-to-asset ratio for nonfinancial corporations.
This section uses revenue projections from the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) (1986) to estimate the course of average tax rates over the
next five years. It compares the tax trajectory without the TRA with the
trajectory under the new legislation, and places the increased corporate
tax burden in historical perspective.
Table 5 compares the paths of corporate tax payments under old law
and the TRA. A detailed description of the calculations is provided in the
Appendix. The first panel shows the level of corporate tax payments by
NFCs in 1986 dollars under the two regimes. Even under old law, corpo-
rate taxes are projected to rise. By 1990, for example, they will be 77 per-
cent higher than in the first five years of the 1980s. Rising corporate tax
payments can be traced to two sources. First, corporate profits are fore-
cast to rise in the late 1980s. Our CBO-based projections imply a profit
rate of 8.2 percent during 1987-1991, compared with 4.9 percent in the
early 1980s. In addition, the front-loading of depreciation under ACRS
implies that the average tax rate on projects undertaken since 1981 is low
early in the project's life and high later on. As more projects reach the
high-tax stage of their life cycle, corporate taxes also rise.
Under the TRA, revenues rise even more rapidly than under old law.
4. Although revenues will be lower immediately after a tax reform like ERTA than they wifi
be in the steady state, it does not follow that tax revenues two years after the reform
are higher than those in the year after the reform. There is a countervailing revenue-
reducing effect: as the stock of assets being depreciated under the generous new rules
rises, tax receipts may decline.16 AUERBACH & POTERBA
By 1990, corporate taxes from the NFCs will exceed $100 billion (1986
dollars), more than double the level of the past five years. For 1987 to
1991, corporate taxes are 22 percent greater under the TRA than under
current law. The new bill's revenue impact is largest in 1987, when it
raises over 30 percent more revenue than the current law. The reason is
that rates remain high, but most tax preferences have been eliminated.
The two lower panels of Table 5 show corporate taxes relative to GNP
and corporate assets. Under current law the tax-to-GNP ratio would rise
from 1.2 percent in 1985 to 1.8 percent in 1991 while the TRA raises this
ratio to 2.2 percent. The new law therefore returns the tax-to-GNP ratio
to its level during the late 1970s but not to the level (3.2 percent on aver-
age) of the 1960s. A similar statement applies to the ratio of tax payments
to net NFC assets, which is plotted in Figure 1. From an average of 1.5
percent during 1981 to 1985, this tax measure rises to 2.6 percent under
old law and to 3.1 percent under new law by 1991. The new law will
Table 5 PROJECTED CORPORATE TAX REVENUES, 1986-1991
Data entries correspond to calendar years and were constructed using Congressional Budget Office
(1986) forecasts of corporate taxes and GNP under the old law, augmented by Joint Tax Committee esti-
mates of the revenue effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
Year
NFC federal taxes as percent of GNP
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double the ratio of taxes to corporate assets, although this ratio will stifi
be lower than it was during the 1960s.
Although part of the change in tax revenues is due to anticipated in-
creases in corporate profits, the average tax rate will also change signifi-
cantly during the next five years. This change is shown in the first two
rows of Table 6, which report the average tax rates under old law and
under the TRA for 1986 to 1991. Without any legislative change, the aver-
age tax rate would have increased from 0.24 in 1985 to 0.30 by 1990. This
is higher than in the first five years of the 1980s but stifi below the level of
the late 1970s. Under new law, by comparison, the average tax rate rises
to 0.36 by the end of the decade, almost returning to its level of the late
1970s. The TRA has its largest impact on the tax rate in the transition
period, 1987 and 1988, when the ratio of taxes to economic profits rises
by 8.1 percent and 6.5 percent, respectively. Figure 2 plots the move-
ments in average tax rates for 1959 to 1985 as well as for the next five
years under both old and new laws.
The TRA changes numerous provisions in the corporate income tax.
The Joint Tax Committee's revenue estimates, for example, include seven-
I'll I' I 'I 'I'II'I'I'I'I' III
6062 64 66 6870 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90
Year
n New law + Old law
Figure 1TAX-TO-ASSET RATIO, 1959-199118 AUERBACH & POTERBA
Table 6 PROJECTED AVERAGE TAX RATES, 1986-1991
Calculations are based on Congressional Budget Office (1986) projections of corporate profits and tax
revenues under pre-1986 law, combined with Joint Tax Committee forecasts of revenue changes from the
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Figure 2 AVERAGE TAX RATE, 1959-1991
Year
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Average tax rate
(old law) 22.9 26.8 29.0 29.7 30.2 29.9
Average tax rate
(new law) 25.1 34.9 35.5 35.3 35.7 35.7
Tax rate differential
newlaw-oldlaw2.2 8.1 6.5 5.6 5.5 5.8
Differential due to
statutory rate 0.0 -6.0 -12.0 -12.0 -12.0 -12.0
capital recovery 1.5 5.6 6.5 8.4 9.6 11.0
accounting rules 1.0 4.1 4.9 4.3 3.5 2.4
other factors -0.3 4.4 7.1 4.9 4.4 4.4WHY HAVE CORPORATE TAX REVENUES DECLINED? 19
teen major categories and hundreds of minor categories through which
revenue changes occur. A detailed analysis of why the average tax rate
will differ from the statutory rate is impossible because many of the re-
quired data series are unavailable. We can, however, provide a rough
sketch of why the average tax rate changes under the new law.
The last four rows in Table 6 disaggregate changes in the effective tax
rate between old law and the TRA into four categories. The first, the
change in the statutory rate, reduces the average rate. There are no rate
changes for 1986. In 1987, the statutory rate falls by 6 percent to the 40
percent "blended" rate for a company whose fiscal year coincides with
the calendar year. Beginning in calendar 1988, the top statutory rate is 34
percent.
Several provisions offset the statutory rate reduction and raise the
average tax rate. The next row shows the impact of changes in capital
recovery provisions, principally the repeal of the ITC and the extension
of tax depreciation lives. This accounts for an 11 percent increase in the
average tax rate in 1991. In the earlier years, it is somewhat less impor-
tant, principally because transition rules allow a substantial share of the
investment undertaken prior to 1988 to obtain favorable tax treatment.5
The penultimate row in Table 6 shows how changes in accounting
rules affect the average tax rate. There are important provisions in this
category, including changes affecting long-term contracts, the capitaliza-
tion of construction and development costs, and the treatment of capital
gains on installment obligations. These accounting changes raise the
average tax rate by nearly 5 percent in 1988, and by an average of 3.8
percent during 1987 to 1991 6 The final row of Table 6 shows how various
other factors cause the average tax rate under the new law to differ from
Our measure of the average tax rate change due to capital recovery may understate the
actual impact of the new law because of the interaction between depreciation provisions
and the strengthened minimum tax. For firms with substantial depreciation deduc-
tions, the new minimum tax may raise tax payments. This is classified as an effect of the
minimum tax, not depreciation rules, in our analysis.
An important caveat applies to the accounting-induced change in average tax rates. Table
6 reports the accounting-induced change in taxes divided by our measure of economic
income. Each accounting change, however, also affects the measured value of economic
income. Repeal of the completed contract method of accounting, for example, will
change the IRS measure of receipts less deductions that forms the basis for our profits
variable. Average tax rates computed relative to measured economic income under the
new tax regime, therefore, would be slightly lower than those reported here, because
income will be higher as a result of these accounting changes. Average tax rates in all
previous years, computed relative to an economic income measure that did not allow for
deferred accrual under the completed contract method, would be lower than those re-
ported in Tables 2 and 3. The change in average rates over time is not affected by the
choice of convention for economic income, even though the level of the average rate is.20 AUERBACH & POTERBA
that under previous law. These provisions include the strengthened
minimum tax, changes in foreign tax credit provisions, and revenues
from increased tax compliance. These miscellaneous provisions increase
the average tax rate by 4.4 percent in 1991.
Although our calculations of the factors behind changes in average tax
rates are necessarily uncertain, they do underscore two important fea-
hires of the TRA. First, changes in capital recovery provisions wifi
significantly raise corporate taxes. By the late 1980s, the differential be-
tween the statutory and the average tax rate that will be attributable to
capital recovery rules will return to its level in the 1960s and 1970s. The
TRA therefore reverses the changes of the early 1980s, when the com-
bination of accelerated depreciation and investment credits lowered aver-
age tax rates by as much as 25 percent. Second, manyof the important
revenue-raising provisions in the new law are excluded from the usual
economic analysis of corporate tax incentives. Marginal effective tax rate
calculations, such as those in King and Fullerton (1984), do not usually
incorporate particular accounting rules, minimum taxes, or many of the
other provisions that have an important effect on corporate investment
incentives.
5. Conclusions
This paper explores why corporate tax revenues have declined for the
last thirty years. Contrary to many claims, legislative changes explain
less than half of the decline in revenues since the mid-1960s. The decline
in corporate profits, which averaged nearly 11 percent of the value of net
corporate assets during the 1960s, as compared with just under 5 percent
in the 1980s, is a more important factor.
Declining corporate tax revenues have been accompanied by a decline
in the average tax rate, the ratio of corporate taxes to economic profits.
Although this average tax rate is of limited value for analyzing the incen-
tive effects of the corporate tax, it has attracted widespread attention in
the recent tax reform discussion. Changes in both the tax law and the
rate of corporate profits affect the average tax rate. The change in de-
preciation provisions between the late 1970s and the early 1980s reduced
the average tax rate by roughly 13 percent.
The TRA, which raises $120 billion in corporate taxes over the next five
years, accelerates the trend toward rising average tax ratesthat would
have occurred under old law. Reduced capital recovery allowances and
other changes in the 1986 Act will combine to raise average effective tax
rates to 36 percent by 1990, compared with 31 percent in the first fiveWHY HAVE CORPORATE TAX REVENUES DECLINED? 21
years of the 1980s. Corporate taxes as a share of GNP and relative to cor-
porate assets wifi also rise significantly. By 1990, federal tax payments
will equal 3 percent of net corporate assets, well above their level in the
early 1980s and approximately equal to their asset share in the late 1970s.
Taxes wifi still remain a smaller fraction of assets than theywere in the
1960s, however, in part because corporate profitabffity is projected to be
well below its level two decades ago. Although we focuson the TRA's
revenue impact over the next five years, this is a potentially misleading
indicator of a tax bill's revenue effects. By lengthening the depreciation
lives of many assets, the new law raises corporate taxrevenues in the
short run at the expense of some reduction in future years. The inherent
uncertainty in long-range forecasts, however, makes it difficult toquan-
tify these effects.
Much of our analysis implicitly divorces the average tax rate from the
corporate profit rate, although such a separation is impossible. Be-
cause corporate taxes do not rise proportionally with corporate profits,
changes in the profit rate have a direct influence on theaverage tax rate.
Over longer horizons, the average tax rate may also affect the profit rate,
at least if average and marginal tax rates move in tandem. Higher tax bur-
dens wifi induce offsetting reductions in capital investment, which
should increase pretax profitability.
Finally, our analysis of revenue changes in the TRA suggests thata
wide range of corporate tax provisions that have importantrevenue
effects are typically ignored in the economic analysis of the corporate in-
come tax. These provisions affect the average and marginal tax rates on
new investment and deserve to be incorporated in future work.
TECHNICAL APPENDIX
DESCRIPTION OF THE AVERAGE TAX RATE DECOMPOSITION
AND DATA SOURCES
This Appendix explains how we allocate changes in theaverage tax rate
into various components, describes our measures of tax payments and
economic income for nonfinancial corporations, and presents a detailed
account of our post-1986 projections.
The Average Tax Rate DecompositionOur average tax rate decomposition
begins from the definition of federal tax receipts from the NFCs:
Taxes = TXISTT - Cbacks - ITC - FTC- Othcred + Retab.(Al)22 AUERBACH & POTERBA
ISTT denotes income subject to tax, r is the maximum statutory corpo-
rate tax rate, and A is a "progressivity parameter" reflecting the fact that
not all taxable income is taxed at the top marginal rate. All the terms on
the right side of (Al) are directly available, except for A. We estimate A,
using data from the Statistics of income sourcebook, as A = Taxbefcred/TISTT,
where Taxbefcred is taxes payable before computation of credits. Invest-
ment tax credits (ITC), foreign tax credits (FTC), other credits (Othcred),
and loss carrybacks (Cbacks) reduce corporate tax receipts. Retab, which
corresponds to the results of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audits and
other changes in previous returns, is typically positive and therefore
raises revenue. Note that our measures of tax credits correspond to ac-
tual, not potential, credits; limits on the use of tax credits may induce
substantial differences between the two in recent years (see Altshuler
and Auerbach (1986) for a discussion).
Whereas taxes are levied on income subject to tax, average tax rates are
calculated relative to the real economic income of shareholders, denoted
by Profits. Income subject to tax and economic income are related by the
identity
Profits = ISTT + NTI + NOL + CCADJ + IVA + Debtgain
- FSI,(A2)
where NTI is the net income of firms with current losses and zero tax-
able income, NOL is the statutory deduction for net operating losses
incurred in previous years, CCADJ is the National Income Accounts
capital consumption adjustment (the difference between tax and eco-
nomic depreciation), WA is the inventory valuation adjustment (again
from NIPA) that measures the spurious profits that result from inflation
on goods in inventory, Debtgain is the transferfrom bondholders to
equity holders that takes place when inflation reduces the value of out-
standing debt, and FSI is the foreign source income of U.S. corporations.
A very helpful reference for understanding the relationship between IRS
and National Income Accounts measures of corporate profits is the U.S.
Department of Commerce (1985).
Equations (Al) and (A2) can be combined to obtain an expression for
tax receipts in terms of economic income. Dividing through this expres-
sion by economic income yields
Taxes/Profits = TA - TA(NTI + NOL + CCADJ + WA + Debtgain
- FSI)/Profits - (ITC + FTC + Othcred)/Profits
+ Cbacks/Profits + Retab/Profits.(A3)WHY HAVE CORPORATE TAX REVENUES DECLINED? 23
We rewrite this expression by grouping together related terms:
Taxes/Profits = r - TX(CCADJ + ITC)/Profits- TX(IVA
+ Debtgain)/Profits - rX(NOL + NTI)/Profits
+ Cbacks/Profits - (FTC - TXFSI)/Profits + r(X- 1)
- Othcred + Retab/Profits.(A4)
The first term on the right side of (A4) is the maximum statutory tax rate.
The six adjustments to the statutory rate required to obtain theaverage
tax rate correspond to the entries in Table 3.
The first adjustment involves capital recovery provisions. It is thesum
of ITCs and CCADJ, the difference between tax depreciation andeco-
nomic depreciation of corporate assets at replacement cost. The National
Income Accounts also disaggregate the CCADJ into the components due
to accelerated depreciation at historic cost and inflationary misstatement
of basis; this breakdown is used in Table 4.
The next adjustment term corresponds to the other distortions of prof-
its related to inflation. It includes the inventory valuation adjustment
and the inflation-induced gain on corporate debt. National Income and
Product Accounts (NIPA) convention defines NA asa negative quantity;
the average tax rate is therefore increasing in the NA, which in turn isan
increasing function of inflation. Debtgain is positive, however, andre-
duces the average tax rate during periods of high inflation, because the
inflation-induced gains of the equity holders are not part of the tax base,
so they yield income but no tax liability. The net effect of these two fac-
tors depends upon the level of leverage and the stock of inventories held
in the corporate sector.
The third adjustment term concerns corporate losses and consists of
three parts. The first is the net income of firms with zero taxable income,
the second adds net operating loss deductions back into taxable income,
and the third adjusts for the use of current losses to obtain carryback
refunds. Again there are countervailing effects. Higher levels of both
NOL deductions and carryback refunds reduce the average corporate tax
rate relative to what it would be in a system that taxed current economic
income. Increases in the losses accruing to currently nontaxable firms,
however, raise the average tax rate. (Nil is a negative number,so an "in-
crease in losses" is a reduction of NTI, although an increase in its abso-
lute value.) Losses raise the average tax rate because economic income is
computed by netting the income of firms with positive profits against
the income of firms with losses. For tax purposes, however, this offset
does not take place. Firms with positive profitspay taxes, and those with24 AUERBACH & POTERBA
negative earnings receive nothing. Imperfect loss-offset provisions there-
fore cause losses to raise the average tax rate.
The fourth adjustment to the statutory rate involves foreign income
and tax credits. The adjustment term equals the tax liabffity that would
have been due on foreign source income if it had been earned in the
United States, minus foreign tax credits claimed. Since foreign tax credits
are subject to a variety of limitations, the net effect of these two factors is
usually to raise average tax rates. Our treatment of foreign source income
also induces a potential relationship between foreign tax rates and the
measured average tax rate on domestic income. For example, income
earned in a country with a corporate tax rate below XT will face addi-
tional tax when repatriated to a U.S. firm. This will raise our measured
average tax rate on domestic income. Such effects are inevitable in any
calculation such as ours that considers the domestic tax rate in one nation
rather than the worldwide tax rate on worldwide income.
The two remaining adjustments are straightforward. The fifth, for the
progressivity of the tax code, measures the change in the average tax rate
due to taxing some positive-income firms at rates below the statutory
maximum. It always reduces the average tax rate, since about 10 percent
of the positive taxable income accruing to corporations is taxed at rates
below the statutory maximum. The final term combines other tax credits
with retabulations. Other tax credits are important primarily in recent
years, when they include the R&D Tax Credit, the New Jobs Credit, and
various energy-related credits. Retabulations consist primarily of audit
profits and minor adjustments to tax returns filed in previous years.
Data SourcesMost of the data series used in our analysis are drawn
from either the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), supple-
mented by unpublished NIPA data, or the IRS Corporation sourcebook of
statistics of income. In some cases, the data series for 1984 and 1985 are
based on preliminary data or have been constructed by extrapolating
1983 values.
The NIPAs present data on federal corporate profits tax liability for the
entire corporate sector, but not for the NFCs. (NIPA also presents total
tax liabilities to all governments, divided into financial and nonfinancial
sectors.) We construct our own estimate of NEC federal taxes, following
the NIPA approach for all corporations as in NIPA Table 8.13. Our tax
measure is
Taxes = Income Taxes Before Credits (SOI) - Tax Credits (SOl)
- Carryback Refunds (NIPA) + Other Retabulations
(NIPA)(A5)WHY HAVE CORPORATE TAX REVENUES DECLINED?. 25
The first two variables are drawn from Statistics of income for 1959 to 1983.
Our sample period begins in 1959 because that is when the IRS began
publishing information on Income Subject to Tax,one of the variables
used in constructing corporate profits. We constructa measure for the
nonfinancial corporate sector as All Returns- Finance Insurance and
Real Estate + Insurance Agents + Real Estate Operators. This isnot
exactly coincident with the NIPA definition, which also includessome
holding companies that cannot be separately identified from the SOT
data, but the differences between the two series are trivial. Carrybacks
and other retabulations are drawn from unpublished data usedto con-
struct NIPA Table 8.13. Our data on these series are for the entirecorpo-
rate sector, because a breakdown for financial versus nonfinancial firms
is not available. The errors associated with the inclusion of financial
firms in these aggregates are also likely to be small.
For 1984 and 1985, our measures of tax creditsare based on forecasts
provided by the Joint Tax Committee. We extrapolated Income Taxes Be-
fore Credits by extrapolating total taxes, using NIPA dataon NFC tax lia-
bility to all levels of government, and then adjusting it for the creditterms
on the right side. We obtained data on the sum of carrybacks and retabu-
lations from the preliminary NIPAs, and assumed carrybacks remained
constant at their 1983 level to divide the series into its two components.
We define real economic profits of the nonfinancial corporatesector as
Profits = Income Subject to Tax (SOT) + Net Operating Loss
Deductions (SOT) + Negative Taxable Income (SOT)
+ CCADJ (NIPA) + WA (NIPA) + Debtgain- FSI(A6)
The data series for Income Subject to Tax and NOL deductionsare drawn
from Statistics of income. WA is reported in the NIPA in Table 1.16. The
measurements of NTI, CCADJ, Debtgain, and FSI require discussion.
NTI is the net income of firms with zero taxable income. It iscom-
puted as the difference between the entries for net income in the Source-
book tables for (i) firms with and without net income, and (ii) firms with
net income. NT! is this difference minus the net income differential for
Subchapter S corporations and the special statutory deductions for firms
with no taxable income.
Although a measure of CCADJ is reported in the National IncomeAc-
counts, we amend it slightly for our analysis. We augment the NIPAmea-
sure of CCADJ (Table 8.4) with the depletion adjustment for domestic
minerals and the adjustment to depreciate expenditures for oil shafts,
wells, and exploration from NIPA Table 8.12. Theseare additional cases
in which tax depreciation differs from economic depreciation,so these26 AUERBACH & POTERBA
terms must be added to the accelerated depreciation componentof
CCADJ.
Debtgain is defined as the fourth-quarter-to-fourth-quarter percentage
change in the GNP deflator times the market value of outstanding NFC
debt at the end of the previous year. The time series for debt at market
value is described in Feldstein and Jun (1986).
FSI is measured as foreign service taxable income minus loss (before
recapture), as reported in various issues of the Statistics of Income Bul-
letin. This corresponds to current taxable income from foreign sources.
Unfortunately, this data series is not available for every year since 1959; it
is available for fourteen of the years between 1961 and 1982. We inter-
polated and extrapolated these data to other years when necessary.
Our measure of economic profits differs from that in the National In-
come Accounts in several ways. The most important is itsinclusion of the
equity holders' capital gain on corporate debt during inflationary peri-
ods. In addition, the National Income Accounts include net foreign
source equity income of all U.S. residents in themeasured corporate
profits. We also include the 15 percent of intercorporate dividends not
exempt from taxation, because the data required to remove this compo-
nent of IRS taxable income were not available before 1978.
All of the series based on NIPA data were available through 1985 ex-
cept for the depletion and oil exploration adjustments, which were avail-
able through 1983. We constructed 1984 and 1985 values for these series
as well as the NOL and NTI series from theIRS by assuming they re-
mained constant at their real 1983 levels. We assumed X remained con-
stant at its 1983 value, and updated ISTT as ISTT = Taxbefcred/'rX, using
our Taxbefcred forecast.
Finally, we measured the current replacement cost of the net tangible
assets held in the nonfinancial corporate sector, using the Federal Re-
serve Board's Balance sheets of the U.S. economy. The Balancesheets report
year-end values, which we averaged to construct the midyear value
for the denominator of our profit rate calculations. We subtract the
FeldsteinJun (1986) measure of the market value of corporate debt to
obtain a series for the net assets of the corporate sector.
Revenue and Average Tax Rate Projections, 1986-1991Most of our calcula-
tions for 1986 to 1991 rely on data from the Congressional Budget Office
(1986). We use their GNP projections and inflation forecasts for the GNP
deflator throughout our calculation.
Our profit variable, Profits, has two components. One corresponds
loosely to real economic profits in the NIPA; the other is Debtgain. To
calculate the Profits components other than Debtgain, we use the CBOWHY HAVE CORPORATE TAX REVENUES DECLINED? 27
forecast of real corporate profits on an NIPA basis, ProfitsNIPA. We com-
pute the ratio (Profits - Debtgain)IProfitsNIPA for 1984 and 1985; the
ratios are 0.747 and 0.703, respectively. Using an average ratio of 0.725,
we forecast Profits - Debtgain based on the CBO forecasts and then add
in Debtgain, calculated as the CBO inflation rate times our extrapolation
of corporate debt (which is the 1985 value extrapolated at the nominal
GNP growth rate).
We compute NFC tax liabffities under old law, using the CBO's fore-
casts of fiscal year corporate tax receipts (p. 63) minus projected receipts
from Federal Reserve banks (taken from the 0MB federal budget projec-
tions for fiscal year (FY) 1987 and years through 1989, with extrapolation
through 1991, holding the series constant in real terms). This tax mea-
sure is a fiscal year indicator of accruals from the whole corporate sector.
We use the ratio of NFC to total federal taxes in 1985 (0.885) to scale this
profit measure for the NFCs, and then convert to calendar years by aver-
aging adjacent fiscal years with weights of 0.75 and 0.25, respectively.
When projections for FY 1992 were needed, we assumed that the fiscal
1991 value grew at the same rate as between FY 1990 and 1991.
Total federal revenues for fiscal years through 1991 are reported in the
CBO (p. 63). We calculated calendar year revenues as a weighted aver-
age, and found the calendar 1991 value by increasing the calendar 1990
value in the same proportion as the fiscal 1991 revenue forecast relative
to the fiscal 1990 forecast. We extrapolated the net replacement value of
NFC assets, assuming they grew in real terms at 1.64 percent per year,
the average growth rate for 1980 through 1985, and fully reflected infla-
tion in the GNP deflator.
Finally, to measure the revenue changes associated with the 1986 TRA,
we rely upon the Joint Tax Committee's revenue estimates presented in
House of Representatives (1986). We estimate the total tax effect for non-
financial corporations as the total change in corporate revenues minus
the changes due to taxation of insurance companies and financial in-
stitutions (titles IX and X of the revenue estimates) minus 0.115 times the
revenue changes for the minimum tax, pension provisions, compliance,
and miscellaneous other provisions (titles VII, XI, XV, and XVII). This
correction adjusts for the share of these revenue changes that arise from
the financial corporations. We adjust all revenue estimates from fiscal to
calendar years using weighted averages, and construct fiscal 1992 esti-
mates by assuming the fiscal 1991 value grows at the same rate as it did
between fiscal 1990 and fiscal 1991. Our measure of capital recovery
changes is just the revenue change due to title II, capital cost provisions,
and that for accounting reforms is the revenue estimate in title VIII.28 AUERBACH & POTERBA
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